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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20010207-CA

DEAN ALLEN MOGEN,

Priority No. 15

Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order dismissing one count of
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third
degree felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia,
a class B misdemeanor.

This Court has jurisdiction over the case

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Was defendant still seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment after the deputy sheriff, who had stopped defendant's
vehicle for speeding, issued a verbal warning citation, returned
defendant's documents, told him he was free to go, and stepped
back from the vehicle?
A bifurcated standard of review governs here.

The trial

court's findings of fact are reviewed deferentially and should be

1

reversed only if they are clearly erroneous.

The court's

conclusions of law growing out of the factual findings, however,
are reviewed for correctness, giving some measure of discretion
to the trial court in applying the legal standards to the facts.
See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v.
Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 916 P.2d
909 (Utah 1996).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated. . . .
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count each of
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia (R. 4 ) . Following a preliminary hearing, the case
was bound over to district court, where defendant filed a motion
to suppress (R. 26, 36-40).

After a hearing on the motion, the

court suppressed the evidence, and the case was dismissed (R. 6062, 71; R. 56-59 or addendum A ) . The State filed a timely notice
of appeal (R. 64-65) .

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 22, 2000, Deputy Sheriff Troy Slaw of the Uintah
County Sheriff's Office stopped a large Dodge flatbed truck for
speeding on SR40 near rural Jensen, Utah (R. 71: 2, 6). Leaving
his overhead lights flashing to alert other motorists of the
stopped vehicles by the side of the road, Slaw approached the
truck, which was driven by defendant, and asked for and obtained
defendant's driver's license (Id. at 3, 9). The officer then
returned to his own vehicle to run a routine license check (Id.
at 3) . After a few minutes, the check came back clear, and Slaw
returned to defendant's vehicle (Id.).
Slaw returned defendant's documents and issued a verbal
warning for speeding (Id. at 3, 8, 13, 16). He also stated that
he explicitly advised defendant that he was free to leave (Id. at
3, 4, 13, 16). Defendant did not respond to the officer's
statements to him (Id. at 3).

The officer also testified that he

did not physically obstruct defendant's departure in any way (Id.
at 10) .
Slaw turned to go, taking a "couple of steps" towards his
patrol vehicle (Id. at 4).

He then turned back towards

defendant, and again made contact with him by asking if he had
any illegal drugs or weapons in the truck and if defendant would
mind if he "took a look" (Id. at 4, 8). Defendant responded that
it would be fine (Id. at 4).

When the officer searched the
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truck, he discovered the items of contraband forming the basis of
the criminal charges against defendant (Id. at 4/ R. 72: 6-8, 89) .
For his part, defendant testified that he did not remember
the officer telling him he was free to go and that if the officer
did tell him, he did not hear it (Id. at 13, 16). Defendant
further testified that when the officer returned his driver's
license, he stared at defendant for a few seconds, causing
defendant to feel that the officer "had something more to say"
(Id. at 14). When asked why he did not leave, defendant
responded that the officer's flasher lights were still on and
also that he was unsure he could safely pull away, given that his
truck had flared-out sides and the officer was standing nearby
(Id. at 14-15) . Defendant did not dispute that he consented to
the search of his vehicle (Id. at 15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in determining that the Fourth
Amendment seizure was continuous and that all evidence seized
pursuant to defendant's consent to search must, therefore, be
suppressed.

The constitutionally-protected seizure ended when

the officer issued a verbal warning, returned defendant's
documents, told defendant he was free to go, and turned away from
defendant, taking a couple of steps towards his patrol vehicle.
At that juncture, the seizure de-escalated to a voluntary level
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one encounter.

The status of the subsequent discussion between

the officer and defendant was, therefore, a level one voluntary
encounter, to which the protections of the Fourth Amendment do
not apply.

Because defendant gave his consent to search during a

voluntary encounter, the evidence discovered as a result should
not have been suppressed.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DETERMINING THAT DEFENDANT WAS
STILL SEIZED WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AFTER THE
OFFICER, WHO HAD STOPPED DEFENDANT
FOR SPEEDING, ISSUED A VERBAL
WARNING, RETURNED HIS DOCUMENTS,
TOLD HIM HE WAS FREE TO GO, AND
STEPPED BACK FROM THE VEHICLE
In granting defendant's suppression motion, the trial court
determined that defendant was not free to go after the officer
gave him a warning citation, returned his documents, and turned
and took a couple of steps back toward his patrol vehicle (R. 58
or addendum A).

Concluding that defendant was, therefore,

continually seized from the moment the officer stopped him, the
court suppressed all evidence discovered during the subsequent
consensual search of the truck (R. 43).
Specifically, the trial court articulated the following
relevant findings of fact as the basis for its ruling:
4. Deputy Slaugh [sic]. . . returned to the
defendant his license and any other paper the
defendant had given him. Deputy Slaugh gave
the defendant a warning for the speeding
5

violation and then turned and took a couple
steps back toward his vehicle.
5. At this time, Deputy Slaugh's overhead
lights were still flashing.
6. Within a few seconds Deputy Slaugh
stepped back to the driver's window and asked
the defendant if he had, "any guns, drugs,
knives or bombs" in his vehicle. Defendant
replied negatively. Deputy Slaugh then asked
the defendant for permission to look.
R. 58 at addendum A.

Based on these facts, the court concluded

that the Fourth Amendment seizure was continuous and that it did
not de-escalate into a level one voluntary encounter when the
officer returned defendant's documents and turned and took a few
steps back toward his patrol car:
2. Based on the facts of this case, the
defendant did not reasonably feel comfortable
in leaving, and the court finds that the
natural inference is that the defendant was
still being detained when the deputy asked
his peirmission to search the defendant's
vehicle.
3. The defendant voluntarily consented to a
search of the vehicle he was driving,
however, the consent was obtained while the
defendant was still within the arena of the
detention of the traffic stop.
Id. at 58.
The court's oral remarks at the suppression hearing
illuminate more fully the rationale underlying the written
ruling:
And it would seem to me to be on the basis of
the facts that I have heard, to draw a fine
line between handing him his license and
6

registration back and telling him he was just
going to warn him for speeding would seem to
me that it would be inappropriate for
[defendant] to even think about leaving or
getting out on the highway, reasonably, to
me, until the Officer was safely back in his
vehicle and had the lights shut off. That
would be a reasonable assumption on my part.

I think that the finding is though, that
given the context of the search, the size of
the highway, the rural nature of the highway,
that the fact that the officer wasn't safely
back in his vehicle and the lights were still
going, at least for the instantaneous time it
took the officer to get back to the door and
ask for the search, I think it would be
unreasonable to assume [defendant] felt
comfortable in leaving. I guess it goes on
the facts and how I would react. That's how
I feel about it.
R. 24-25, 25-26 at addendum B.
The gist of the court's ruling, then, is that the return of
defendant's documents did not de-escalate the Fourth Amendment
seizure to a level one voluntary encounter because defendant had
"objectively reasonable cause" to believe he was still seized.
The continuing seizure seems based on two facts - that the
officer had not yet returned to his patrol vehicle and that he
had not yet turned off his flasher lights.1
1

While the court also mentioned "the context of the
search, the size of the highway, [and] the rural nature of the
highway," it failed to explain how these factors impacted the
conclusion that defendant was not free to leave (R. 71 at 25).
In contrast, the court repeatedly mentioned that the officer had
not returned to his patrol car and that his flasher lights were
still on (Id.).
7

The trial court's analysis is flawed because it gives undue
weight to these two facts while failing to consider others, as a
proper analysis requires.

State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244

(Utah 1994)(citations omitted).
The proper legal analysis begins with an assessment of
whether one is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. Here,
defendant was plainly seized when the deputy sheriff stopped his
truck for speeding.

See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663

(1979)(stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes).
Because defendant was seized, the dispositive analysis turns
on how long the initial, constitutionally-protected seizure
lasted.2

Once an individual has been seized, for the seizure to

end, it must be clear to the seized person, either from the words
of an officer or from the clear import of the circumstances, that
the person is at liberty to go about his or her business.
Higgins, 884 P.2d at 1244 (citing United States v. Sandoval, 29
2

See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah
1987)(quoting United States v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th
Cir. 1984)(citation omitted))(articulating three categories of
constitutionally permitted police-citizen encounters). The three
categories of constitutionally permitted police-citizen
encounters are, of course, not static. Thus, a level one
consensual encounter can escalate into a level two seizure or a
level three arrest, or vice versa. See United States v. Shareef,
100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996)(explaining relationship
between levels of police-citizen encounters). Only the second
and third levels, however, implicate the protections of the
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225,
1227 (Utah App. 1997).
8

F.3d 537, 540-41 (10th Cir. 1994)).
In determining whether a detainee is free to go, courts look
to several circumstances.

The return of a detained driver's

documents signals one line of demarcation.

Thus, federal courts

"have consistently concluded that an officer must return a
driver's documentation before a detention can end."

United

States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1997)(citing
United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1996) and
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1404 (10th Cir. 1990)).
That action, however, will not necessarily render any subsequent
interchange consensual "if the driver has objectively reasonable
cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave."

United

States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing
United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 959 (10th Cir.), cert,
denied 502 U.S. 881 (1991)); accord Elliott, 107 F.3d at 814 (and
cases cited therein).

In this case, where the parties agree that

the officer returned defendant's documentation, the court must
look to see if defendant had other objective reasonable cause to
believe he was not free to leave (R. 71: 3, 8, 13).
The officer's words constitute an important part of the
analysis.

Certainly, telling the detainee that he is free to

leave is a strong indication that a seizure is over.
Nonetheless, the police need not necessarily tell a detainee
explicitly that he is free to go in order for a seizure to de-
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escalate into a consensual encounter.
U.S. 33, 33-34 (1996).

Ohio v. Robinette. 519

Here, the trial court, faced with

differing testimony from the two witnesses present, refused to
enter a finding about the officer's words. At the suppression
hearing, after articulating oral findings and conclusions
suppressing the evidence found in the truck, the trial court
asked whether counsel wanted any additional findings (R. 71: 25
at addendum B).

The following colloquy occurred:

Prosecution:

Yes, would you please make a
finding concerning whether or
not the officer indicated that
[defendant] was free to go?

The Court:

I can't make a finding on
that. The evidence was
contrary. I mean, the officer
said you're free to go.
[Defendant] said he didn't
hear him say that. The Court
has an insufficient record to
make a finding on that.

Id. at 25. The trial court's determination that it could not
make a finding on whether the officer told defendant he was free
to leave is clearly erroneous.
Officer Troy Slaw testified at both the preliminary hearing
and the suppression hearing.

On both occasions, he unequivocally

stated that, after returning defendant's documents, he told
defendant that he was free to go (R. 72: 4, 17; R. 71: 3, 10).
Defendant testified at the suppression hearing, stating, "I don't
recall him telling me I was free to go" (R. 71: 13). Later in
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the hearing, the following interchange occurred:
Prosecution:

After he'd given you back your
driver's license and your
registration, he had told you
that he was not going to cite
you for the speeding, is that
correct?

Defendant:

Exactly.

Prosecution:

And you do not recall whether
or not he said you were free
to go?

Defendant:

No.

Prosecution:

It's possible that he did?

Defendant:

Well, I didn't hear him say
it.

R. 71: 16. Defendant's testimony about what the officer said
regarding his freedom to leave is quoted in its entirety.

At no

time did defendant testify that the officer told him he could not
leave.

Nor did defendant testify that the officer did not tell

him he was free to go.

Rather, defendant's testimony consisted

of two statements: first, that he could not recall whether or not
the officer told him he was free to go; and second, that he did
not hear the officer say that he was free to go.

Id.

Defendant's lack of recall or inability to hear should not
have precluded the trial court from entering a finding of fact as
to whether the officer told defendant he was free to leave. At
the outset, the evidence was not contrary, as the trial court
averred.

That is, one person can easily make a statement that
11

another either does not remember or does not hear.3

Moreover,

even if the evidence had been contrary, it was the trial court's
role, as finder of fact, to make the necessary credibility
determination to resolve the factual dispute between the
witnesses.

See, e.g., State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah

1993); ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App.
1997).

The trial court erred by abrogating this responsibility.

Kinkella v. Bauah, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983).
If this Court determines that the omission of the factual
finding is dispositive to the outcome of this appeal, then this
Court should remand the case for resolution of the material
factual issue.

If it is not, then this Court may dispose of the

matter as harmless error.

See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025

(Utah App. 1993).
In addition to the return of the driver's documents and the
words of the officer, courts also look to the conduct of the
police towards the detainee in evaluating the objective
reasonableness of the circumstances facing a detainee:
Examples of circumstances that might indicate
a sei2:ure, even where the person did not
attempt to leave, would be the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of
a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or the
use of language or tone of voice indicating

3

In fact, the only real conflict in the evidence was
defendant's internal inconsistency in testifying both that he did
not remember and that he did not hear (Id. at 13, 16).
12

that compliance with the officer's request
might be compelled.
State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1996) (citing
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980)(citations
omitted))/ accord State v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th
Cir. 1997); Turner, 928 F.2d at 959.

In this case, there is no

record evidence that the lone officer drew his weapon, physically
touched the defendant in any way, or used language or a tone of
voice indicating that defendant might be compelled to remain.
See Patefield, 927 P.2d at 659 (citations omitted).

Indeed, the

only evidence supporting a continued detention was defendant's
testimony that the uniformed officer "stared" at him for "just a
few seconds" after returning his documents (R. 71: 13-14).
The case of People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556 (111. 1999)
is instructive on this point.

There, defendant was stopped for a

traffic violation, and the officer checked and returned his
documents.

Id. at 559.

The officer himself testified that after

explaining he would not issue a citation, he then "'paused' for
'a couple [of] minutes'" while he stood at the driver's door and
another officer stood at the passenger door.

Id. at 565. He

then asked for and obtained permission to search.

The court

determined that standing by the door silently for at least two
minutes constituted a "show of authority" by the police and that
a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under such
circumstances.

Id. at 565-66.

Further, in response to the
13

request to search, defendant asked if he had a choice in the
matter, thus reinforcing the court's determination that defendant
was not free to go.

Id. at 566.

Contrast the facts in Brownlee with the case at bar, where
defendant, not the officer, testified that the lone officer
stared at him, but "for just a few seconds" (R. 71: 14).
Defendant's candid admission that the officer's "stare" was
fleeting supports the conclusion that, unlike Brownlee, the
Fourth Amendment seizure here had ended.

In addition, when asked

if his truck could be searched, defendant in this case answered
that it would be "fine," thus giving no indication that he felt
in any way compelled (Id. at 4).
In addition, both defendant and the State agree that Officer
Slaw either stepped back and moved away from the truck or turned
around and took a couple of steps towards his patrol vehicle (Id.
at 4, 16). Under either scenario, the officer's undisputed
physical withdrawal also supports the termination of the
constitutionally protected seizure.

See Commonwealth v.

Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 900 (Pa. 2000) (in determining that
seizure ended, court stated that although officer did not utter
explicit words of release, his actions of returning documents,
thanking defendant for cooperation, and turning away prior to
reinitiating interaction "at least suggested" that defendant was
free to go).

14

The trial court's analysis is flawed not only because it
fails to consider these aspects of the encounter but also because
it gives undue weight to two other factors - the brief time
between the officer's withdrawal and his recontact with
defendant, and the fact that the officer had not yet returned to
his vehicle and turned off his flasher lights.
First, as to the length of the time between the officer
stepping away and his recontact with defendant as an indicator of
a continuing seizure, the court has distorted the proper test (R.
71: 25). Logically, the assessment of when a seizure ends must
be made as of the point in time, however brief, when the facts
indicate that defendant is free to go.

See Mendenhall. 446 U.S.

at 545-46. To apply the test in hindsight, after subsequent
interactions, confuses the analysis by tacking on later events
that skew the legal status of the encounter at the moment it
shifts to a voluntary encounter.
Second, the court's analysis puts undue weight on the
officer's return to his vehicle.

The court stated that "it would

be inappropriate for [defendant] to even think about leaving or
getting out on the highway, reasonably, to me, until the officer
was safely back in his vehicle and had the lights shut off. That
would be a reasonable assumption on my part" (R. 71: 25 at
addendum B).

The trial court has offered no support for this new

legal standard by which to assess when a Fourth Amendment seizure

15

has ended, and the State finds no support for such a proposition.
Because the facts demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment
seizure de-escalated to a level one voluntary encounter when the
officer returned defendant's documents, issued a verbal warning,
told him he was free to go, and turned and stepped away from
defendant's truck, this Court should reverse the trial court's
dismissal of the case and remand for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the
district court order dismissing the charges against defendant and
remand the case for trial.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Jj£_ day of October, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
DEAN ALLEN MOGEN,

No. 001800211
Defendant.

Judge John R. Anderson

This matter came on for an Evidentiary Hearing before John R.
Anderson,

Eighth

District

Court,

on

November

29,

2000,

on

defendant's Motion to Suppress.
The State of Utah was represented by Attorney G. Mark Thomas.
Defendant was present and represented by his attorney, Richard P.
Mauro.
Uintah County Sheriff Deputy Troy Slaugh was called as a
witness for the State and was cross examined. Dean Allen Mogen was
called as a witness for the defense and was cross examined.
The Court, after hearing

the evidence and arguments of

counsel, does enter its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On August 22, 2000, Deputy Troy Slaugh stopped the

defendant, Dean Allen Mogen, for exceeding the posted 50 mph speed
limit on State Route 40 in the Jensen, Utah area.
2.

The defendant was the only person in the vehicle which

was a truck used in defendant's work.
3.

Deputy Slaugh asked for and received defendant's driver

license and possibly the vehicle registration. Deputy Slaugh then
went back to his patrol car and performed a routine driver's
license and warrants check.
4.

Deputy Slaugh then returned to the driver side of the

defendant's vehicle and returned to the defendant his license and
any other paper the defendant had given him.

Deputy Slaugh gave

the defendant a warning for the speeding violation and then turned
and took a couple steps back toward his vehicle.
5.

At this time Deputy Slaugh's overhead lights were still

flashing.
6.

Within a few seconds Deputy Slaugh stepped back to the

driver's window and asked the defendant if he had, "any guns,
drugs, knives or bombs' in his vehicle.
negatively.

Defendant

replied

Deputy Slaugh then asked the defendant for permission

to look.
7. The defendant agreed to allow Deputy Slaugh to look in his
vehicle.
2

CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
1.

On August 22, 2000, Deputy Troy Slaugh made a legal

traffic stop on the vehicle which the defendant was the sole
occupant in.
2.

Based on facts of this case, the defendant did not

reasonably feel comfortable in leaving, and the court finds that
the natural inference is that the defendant was still being
detained when the deputy asked his permission to search the
defendant's vehicle.
3.

The defendant voluntarily consented to a search of the

vehicle he was driving, however, the consent was obtained while the
defendant was still within the arena of the detention of the
traffic stop.
4.

Based on the case law for Utah, an officer does not have

the right to ask for consent to search a vehicle during a traffic
stop unless there is an independent constitutionally permitted
basis for either the request or the search.
DATED this

l^day

of

<?4$'

^vO. 2001.

son
Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Richard Mauro
Attorney for Defendant
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Addendum B

cases that have been cited by defense counsel are not cases
wheiein there's been a clear break and a return of the items.
Most of those cases, the ones that I've been familiar with, are
where the officer actually continued the detention and either
did not return the driver's license or in some other way
continued the existing detention.
That's not the case here. There was a clear break
and what the courts have been saying in Utah are basically,
there has to be some sort of continuation from the traffic stop
versus the next contact which was voluntary and consensual
which occurred in this case.

He had returned everything, told

the defendant he was free to go, stepped back and then made a
new contact and sought consent.
THE COURT:

Thank you, counsel.

These cases are very fact sensitive and the Court is
familiar with the Utah State Case Law and some of the Court of
Appeals decisions regarding these issues.

Some of them are

hard to distinguish but I think the distinguishing thing that
we need to focus on would be given the context of the setting,
and the context of the rural area, the context of many things,
it would seem to me, was Mr. Mogen reasonably justified in
believing that he could go ahead and leave?

And it would seem

to me to be on the basis of the facts that I have heard, to
draw a fine line between handing him his license and
registration back and telling him he was just going to warn him

24

1

for speeding, would seem to me that it would be inappropriate

2

for Mr* Mogen to even think about leaving or getting out on the

3

highway, reasonably, to me, until the Officer was safely back

4

in his vehicle and had the lights shut off.

5

reasonable assumption on my part.

6

That would be a

I think the fact of the hesitancy, the quick return

7

by the officer and asking for the consent search went beyond

8

the scope of the original stop and I think in this case, that

9

Mr, Mogen would, by the testimony that I've heard, was not

10

justified in feeling that he was free to leave.

11

to suppress the evidence.

12

want me to make any additional findings?

13 I

MR. THOMAS:

So, I'm going

That will be the ruling.

Do you

Yes, would you please make a finding

14

concerning whether or not the officer indicated that he was

15

free to go?

16
17

THE COURT:

I can't make a finding on that. The

evidence was contrary.

I mean, the officer said you're free to

18 [ go. Mr. Mogen said he didn't hear him say that.

The Court has

19

an insufficient record to make a finding on that.

I think that

20

the finding ia though, that given the context of the search,

21

the size of the highway, the rural nature of the highway, that

22

the fact that the officer wasn't safely back in his vehicle and

23

the lights were still going, at least for the instantaneous

24

time it took the officer to get back to the door and ask for

25 J the search, I think it would be unreasonable to assume Mr.
25

1

Mogen felt comfortable in leaving.

2

facts and how I would react.

3
4

MR. THOMAS:

I guess it goes on the

That's how I feel about it.

And are you finding this under the

United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution?

5

THE COURT:

I'm looking at the Utah Case Law and

6

relying on Mr. Mauro's argument there.

I do not know what fact

7

distinctions there are specifically in the cases cited, Mr.

8

Thomas but I know that in this case, it would seem to me, that

9 1 Mr. Mogen would not have felt comfortable in leaving before the
10

officer returned and asked to search the vehicle.

11

MR. THOMAS:

So is it the Court's finding that an

12

officer cannot seek consent unless it's reasonable that the

13

defendant feels comfortable in leaving?

14

THE COURT:

No.

No.

I think he was detained.

I

15

think the reasonable inference was that he was still being

16

detained.

17

telling you that they are fact sensitive and it is my feeling,

18

my view of the evidence, that Mr. Mogen was still in the arena

I don't want to make a hard line rule on it.

I'm

19 I of detention when the consent was sought.
20

MRv THOMAS:

21

THE COURT: And it exceeded the scope of the original

22

stop*

23
24

Okay.

MR. THOMAS:

An additional fact, is it the Court's

finding that the officer did in fact step away from the window

25 I after 26

THE COURT:

That's what the evidence showed.

He

stepped away, although it may have been unsafe for him to be
where he was.
video.

We don't have distance in feet.

He stepped away.

We don't have a

The testimony was within a few

seconds, he was there, back.
Thank you, counsel.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)

